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INTRODUCTION
The increasing digitization of content has created numerous
challenges to copyright enforcement over the last two decades, as
copies became near-perfect and infringement became easy and
inexpensive.1 The spread of digital content shares a symbiotic
relationship with the growth and development of the Internet as a
tool for communication and commerce. Innovations in digitization
technology have been spurred by the desire for efficient and highquality methods of transmitting content via the Internet. This
technology has evolved as Internet transmission technologies have

A PDF version of this Article is available online at http://iplj.net/blog/archives/
volumexxi/book2. Visit http://iplj.net/blog/archives for access to the IPLJ archive.
*
LL.M. in Intellectual Property and Information Technology Law, Fordham
University School of Law, 2010; J.D., University of Pennsylvania Law School, 2005;
A.B., Princeton University, 2002.
1
VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER, DELETE: THE VIRTUE OF FORGETTING IN THE
DIGITAL AGE 52–62 (Princeton Univ. Press 2009) (discussing the development and
implications of digitization).
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improved, allowing more datathus larger and higher-quality
content files—to speed around the globe.2
In particular, the last several years have seen the growth of
“cloud computing,” allowing users to employ a variety of
protocols, applications, and transmission techniques to store data
and to harness the processing power of remote servers, often
controlled by third-party providers.3 The development of cloud
computing, heralded by more-expansive and less-expensive
broadband Internet connections, is poised to add a new challenge
to copyright enforcement as more users take to the cloud to store,
transmit, manipulate, and share content.
This Article will identify likely problem areas for copyright
enforcement arising from this technological trend and, through an
analysis of recent copyright jurisprudence involving cloud
computing, describe the present and near-term viability of
copyright enforcement in the cloud.4 Part I will focus on cloud
computing: what the term comprises and what its design and
implementation suggest about the viability of copyright
enforcement, including challenges posed by different types of
cloud computing. Part II will set out the framework of copyright
law relevant to this issue. Part III will review some recent cases
involving copyright and different types or aspects of cloud
computing to analyze the near-term viability of enforcement in the
cloud.
I. DEFINING “CLOUD COMPUTING”
Cloud computing refers to a set of approaches to diffuse
computing power across more than one physical computer.5 These
approaches are generally divided into three categories:

2

Id. at 80 (describing the rapid development and deployment of global high-speed
data networks).
3
See infra Part I.
4
This Article will not discuss user liability or the viability of enforcement against
individual infringers.
5
See Peter Mell & Tim Grance, The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing, NAT’L
INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., INFO. TECH. LAB. (Oct. 7, 2009), http://csrc.nist.gov/
groups/SNS/cloud-computing/cloud-def-v15.doc [hereinafter NIST Definition].
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Infrastructure-as-a-Service
(“IaaS”),
Platform-as-a-Service
(“PaaS”), and Software-as-a-Service (“SaaS”).6
Nearly all
computer users today, and an even greater portion of Internet users,
utilize some method of cloud computing in their day-to-day
activities.7 To illustrate this point, the top five websites by visits,
accounting for nearly one-quarter of all website visits in a given
week, consist of two search engines/portals and three sites that can
readily be considered examples of SaaS cloud computing:
Facebook, the social networking site and number one website by
traffic; Yahoo! Mail, the number one webmail provider by
accounts; and YouTube, a video sharing site that will be discussed
in more detail below.8
By contrast, a user with no presence “in the cloud” would be
restricted to use only software found on her own computer, use email, if at all, that is hosted and operated on servers that she
controls, and eschew any interactive Internet sites, including all
social networking sites.9 While there are certainly those who
operate in this framework, it is neither the norm in practice nor the
prevailing business model in the computing or broader technology
markets.10 This comparison implicitly identifies why cloud

6

Id.
John Horrigan, Use of Cloud Computing Applications and Services, PEW INTERNET
(Sept. 12, 2008), http://www.pewInternet.org/Reports/2008/Use-of-Cloud-ComputingApplications-and-Services.aspx.
8
Top 20 Sites & Engines, EXPERIAN HITWISE, http://www.hitwise.com/us/
datacenter/main/dashboard-10133.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2010).
9
Pat Bitton, Tech Beat: Cloud Computing—What Is It, and Why Should You Care?,
TIMES-STANDARD, Oct. 8, 2010, http://www.times-standard.com/business/ci_16286491
(“If you’re using applications like Google Mail or Salesforce.com, you’re already using
cloud computing.”); Michael Otey, The Rise of Cloud Computing, WINDOWSITPRO (Apr.
26, 2010), http://www.windowsitpro.com/article/cloud-computing2/The-Rise-of-CloudComputing/2.aspx (“Cloud-based services such as Gmail and Hotmail have been in
widespread use for years. Social-media sites such as Facebook and MySpace are also
cloud-based services that millions of consumers have adopted and even take for
granted.”).
10
See, e.g., Brad Stone & Ashlee Vance, Companies Slowly Join Cloud-Computing,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/19/technology/
19cloud.html (describing the gradual adoption of cloud computing by companies in
several industry sectors).
7
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computing has been described as a new avenue of competition for
the major players in the computer industry, such as Microsoft.11
Cloud computing relies on the technology of virtualization,
which allows an application to create and manage non-permanent,
virtual (software-based) servers on physical server hardware.12 It
is this virtualization that provides the seemingly endless elasticity
that is essential to cloud computing: “Virtualization means that email, Web, or file servers (or anything else) can be conjured up as
soon as they are needed; when the need is gone, they can be wiped
from existence, freeing the host computer to run a different virtual
machine for another user.”13 Modern cloud computing is a
matured version of the mainframe-terminal system that was in
vogue in the 1960s and 1970s, where companies would provide
employees with “dumb” terminals with which to access the
“smart” mainframe.14 The terminals would require only enough
processing power to connect to the mainframe, where the real work

11

See William H. Page, Microsoft and the Limits of Antitrust, 6 J. COMPETITION L. &
ECON. 33, 49–50 (2010) (suggesting that nascent cloud computing implementations can
challenge established players, like Microsoft, shifting the antitrust analysis). Page quotes
a “florid” description of possible advantages to be found in the cloud:
Cloud computing offers virtually unlimited, on-demand computing
resources. Your applications now live in a new platform—a
computing cloud. In the cloud, your applications take advantage of
the seemingly limitless processor cycles, memory storage, and
network bandwidth along with extensive software capabilities. Your
applications only pay for what they use. Beyond basic computing
resources, cloud computing offers a range of application services that
form a new platform—an Internet operating system—suitable for cost
effective, dynamic, and Internet-scale solutions. An Internet
operating system offers the scale and services required to meet the
requirements of a dynamic, global, software application.
Id. at 50 (quoting Dana Moore & John Hebeler, Computing in the Clouds, DR. DOBB’S
(Feb. 3, 2009), http://www.drdobbs.com/architecture-and-design/213000642;jsessionid=
UMKP$MKFRG4SNQE1GHPSKH WATM32JVN).
12
See Erica Naone, Conjuring Clouds: How Engineers Are Making On-Demand
Computing a Reality, TECH. REV., Jul.–Aug. 2009, at 54, available at http://
www.technologyreview.com/computing/22606.
13
Id.
14
Id. (“‘Cloud computing is a reincarnation of the computing utility of the 1960s but is
substantially more flexible and larger scale than the [systems] of the past,’ says Google
executive and Internet pioneer Vint Cerf.”).
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was done.15 Just as “time sharing” once did, modern cloud
computing creates the illusion that a user’s individual computer is
more powerful than it actually is.16 Today, readily-deployed
virtualization allows this approach to computing to be employed
dynamically on a global scale.
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (“NIST”)
has developed a series of definitions seeking to encompass key
elements of the diverse field of cloud computing.17 These
definitions, consisting of “five essential characteristics, three
service models, and four deployment models,” provide helpful
structure to this discussion.18 The “essential characteristics” are:
on-demand self-service, broad network access, resource pooling,
rapid elasticity, and measured service.19
For the discussion of copyright enforcement in the cloud, the
first two of these—self-service and broad network access—are the
most important. Briefly, broad network access suggests the basis
of the “problem” from the perspective of copyright owners. It is
the characteristic that allows users to access and share their, or
other users’, cloud-based files and systems from virtually
anywhere with broadband connections. Self-service speaks to the
resulting liability questions, at the heart of this Article; namely
whether the user or the system is committing and thereby liable for
infringement when it occurs. As NIST defines it, the on-demand
self-service characteristic means that, “[a] consumer can
unilaterally provision computing capabilities, such as server time
and network storage, as needed automatically without requiring
human interaction with each service’s provider.”20 The need for

15

See, e.g., Jeffrey Voas & Jia Zhang, Cloud Computing: New Wine or Just a New
Bottle?, ITPRO, Mar.–Apr. 2009, at 15, available at http://www.cs.pitt.edu/
~ezegarra/Grid_computing/papers/Cloud%20Computing%20New%20Wine%20or%20
Just%20a%20New%20Bottle.pdf (“In Phase 1, people used terminals to connect to
powerful mainframes shared by many users. Back then, terminals were basically little
more than keyboards and monitors.”).
16
See, e.g., NELL DALE & JOHN LEWIS, COMPUTER SCIENCE ILLUMINATED 328 (2006)
(describing mainframe time-sharing).
17
See NIST Definition, supra note 5.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
NIST Definition, supra note 5 (emphasis added).
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human oversight, or lack thereof, on the provider side can play a
key role in the analysis of provider liability, as will be discussed
more fully below.21 While the Copyright Act is generally
understood to be and is applied as a strict liability statute,22 courts
have found a distinction in recent years where the defendant’s
system is automatically making the potentially infringing copies.23
The “self-service” characteristic of cloud computing speaks to this
very question of volitional conduct.
Recent case law has increasingly suggested that copies created
as a result of user conduct and choice will generally not devolve
liability to the service provider, even where the system making the
copies was created and is owned and maintained by a service
provider.24 Certainly the NIST definition cannot answer the
question in a given scenario of whether a system was making
copies at a user’s behest, but the existence of the definition, as a
guideline to system operators and developers, can serve to bolster
21

See infra notes 190–200 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 308 (2d Cir.
1963) (“While there have been some complaints concerning the harshness of the principle
of strict liability in copyright law, courts have consistently refused to honor the defense
of absence of knowledge or intention.” (citation omitted)); Sony/ATV Music Publ’g LLC
v. CAVS USA, Inc., No. 3:08-0265, 2009 WL 2177110, at *11 (M.D. Tenn. July 21,
2009) (“[C]opyright infringement is a strict liability offense in the sense that it does not
require that Plaintiffs demonstrate Defendants’ intent to infringe, or even knowledge of
the infringement.”).
23
See, e.g., Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 131 (2d Cir.
2008) (“When there is a dispute as to the author of an allegedly infringing instance of
reproduction, Netcom and its progeny direct our attention to the volitional conduct that
causes the copy to be made.” (discussing Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line
Commc’n Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995))); see also CoStar Grp., Inc. v.
LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 549 (4th Cir. 2004) (“While the court in Netcom did point
out the dramatic consequences of a decision that would hold ISPs strictly liable for
transmitting copyrighted materials through their systems without knowledge of what was
being transmitted, the court grounded its ruling principally on its interpretation of § 106
of the Copyright Act as implying a requirement of ‘volition or causation’ by the
purported infringer. This construction is one for which we have already indicated our
preference over the contrary decision described in [Playboy].” (comparing Netcom with
Playboy Enters. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993))); Parker v. Yahoo!, Inc.,
No. 2:07-cv-02757-MAM, 2008 WL 4410095, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 25, 2008)
(“Although copyright infringement generally operates under a theory of strict liability,
various courts have required an additional element of ‘volition or causation’ to find direct
infringement.”).
24
See infra notes 190–200 and accompanying text.
22
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an argument along these lines, potentially allowing the service
provider to avoid liability.
The “broad network access” characteristic stresses network
availability and the ability of the consumer to access the data or
service through a variety of client platforms, including “mobile
phones, laptops, and PDAs [personal digital assistants].”25 The
ability to broadly view and distribute content is at the heart of the
copyright enforcement problem online, so its place on the list of
essential characteristics makes clear the relevance of this
discussion to ongoing enforcement efforts. Pre-digitization,
copyright enforcement was still difficult, but usually due to lack of
scale: individual bootleggers selling a small quantity of a limited
selection of copied material.26 Now, users want and expect all
content to be accessible everywhere, all the time.27 Though this
Article is not addressing the issue of individual infringers,
ubiquitous, high-speed connectivity has been a boon for this type
of scofflaw.28 As to our focus, legitimate, law-abiding users are
rarely concerned with whether and how a back-end system makes
copies of copyrighted content to ensure the broad access that they
demand. Broad network access also involves more parties in the
transmission of data, increasing the number of Internet service
providers and other intermediaries who must handle and pass along
the data, potentially creating automatic, short-lived (or other)
copies as part of the process.29
The approaches listed earlier—IaaS, PaaS, and SaaS—are
referred to in the NIST definition as the three “service models.”30
Software-as-a-Service is the model with which most people are
25

NIST Definition, supra note 5.
See, e.g., Brett Lunceford & Shane Lunceford, Meh. The Irrelevance of Copyright in
the Public Mind, 7 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 33 (describing pre-digital examples of
copyright infringement).
27
See, e.g., TECHNOLOGY CONFERENCE AT SUPERCOMM 2009, FUTURE VISION OF
MOBILE BROADBAND 12 (Oct. 21–22, 2009), http://www.atis.org/supercomm/
Presentations/LTE%20Track/Future%20Vision%20of% 20Mobile%20Broadband.pdf.
28
See, e.g., William F. Adkinson, Jr., Liability of P2P File-Sharing Systems for
Copyright Infringement by their Users, PERIODIC COMMENTS. ON THE POLICY DEBATE, 4–
5 (2004), http://www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/pop11.7p2psystems.pdf.
29
DAVID G. POST, IN SEARCH OF JEFFERSON’S MOOSE 87 n.3 (2009) (describing the
process by which ISPs relay messages across the Internet).
30
NIST Definition, supra note 5.
26
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likely familiar. The most common example is web-based e-mail,
where the consumer is using the provider’s infrastructure and
application, with perhaps a limited ability to specify user
preferences. Social networking sites—Facebook, LinkedIn, and
others—function similarly, to the extent users are inputting and
uploading content and making connections via the sites’ respective
interfaces. Even the now-taken-for-granted act of shopping online
involves some interaction with SaaS cloud computing when the
consumer enters her credit card number and the provider’s serverside software, often controlled by a third party to the transaction,
processes the order information. Given the “closed sandbox”
nature of most SaaS applications (meaning that users’ options and
their ability to modify the application are strictly limited) copyright
owners could argue that SaaS operators have a greater ability—and
thus a greater duty—to police infringement on their systems. This
will be discussed more below.
Platform-as-a-Service describes a system where the user can
deploy her own applications, “created using programming
languages and tools supported by the provider.”31 However, the
consumer’s control is limited to those applications and perhaps
some control of the hosting environment configurations.32 In this
model, the consumer may benefit from the greater processing
power or storage capacity of the provider’s system, or may need
access to the rapid elasticity listed as an essential characteristic
above. Infrastructure-as-a-Service takes the Platform-as-a-Service
model a step further and gives the user control over all
fundamental computing resources, down to “operating systems,
storage, deployed applications, and possibly limited control of
select networking components (e.g., host firewalls).”33 Engaging
with an IaaS provider is equivalent to outsourcing a user’s full data
center needs, retaining the ability to access the center’s operations
via the Internet.
Both PaaS and IaaS involve primarily the dedication of
physical resources—servers, network connections, etc.—so the

31
32
33

Id.
See id.
See id.
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level of control remaining with the cloud service provider is
arguably lower than is found in SaaS. While copyright owners
could demand that service providers police these systems, PaaS
and IaaS providers could counter that argument by explaining that
to inspect every byte that crosses a user’s virtual server would
cripple a predominantly legitimate business.34 For example,
Amazon.com, with its Amazon Web Services (“AWS”) and Elastic
Cloud Compute (“EC2”) products, among others, is one of the
largest providers of IaaS cloud computing services.35 One of its
featured case studies is Sorenson Media, “a provider of video
solutions.”36 Amazon, as a provider of cloud computing services
to Sorenson Media, would likely argue that it would be
unreasonable to put it in the position of policing for copyright
infringement the readily scalable server space that Sorenson
provisions. Such server space includes storage, database servers,
application servers and a content delivery network.37
NIST also describes four deployment models, detailing how
cloud infrastructure can be operated and made available: private
cloud, community cloud, public cloud, and hybrid cloud.38 All
four may be managed by third-party providers, but the availability
of the infrastructure of private and community clouds is limited to
a certain set of users: either a single organization (private) or a
A public cloud’s
group of organizations (community).39
infrastructure is made available to the general public and is owned

34

See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442
(1984) (applying patent law’s “substantial noninfringing use” standard to copyright).
35
What Is AWS?, AMAZON WEB SERVS., http://aws.amazon.com/what-is-aws (last
visited Oct. 13, 2010).
36
AWS Case Study: Sorenson Media, AMAZON WEB SERVS., http://aws.amazon.com/
solutions/case-studies/sorenson-media (last visited Oct. 13, 2010).
37
Id. (“Today, the Sorenson 360 Video Delivery Network service is architected
entirely on top of Amazon Web Services—including Amazon EC2, Amazon S3 and
Amazon CloudFront. [Sorenson’s Vice President of Engineering, Charles] Sismondo
explains, ‘At the most simple level, when a customer uploads a video it hits our EC2 app
servers, creating a database entry, sitting inside an S3 bucket and then pushed to the
cloud for Cloudfront deployment and consumption . . . . We’ve also added a service layer
that includes UltraDNS, Scalr and Pingdom to facilitate optimum interaction, uptime and
availability of these services.’”).
38
NIST Definition, supra note 5.
39
See id.
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by a company selling cloud services. A hybrid cloud combines
two or more of these deployment models. Each model raises
challenges for copyright enforcement, though private and
community clouds somewhat mitigate the problem of identifying
the primary infringer, which plagues enforcement on the open
Internet.40
II. COPYRIGHT LAW IN THE CLOUD
Before further examining how cloud computing poses specific,
and perhaps new or modified, challenges to copyright enforcement,
this article now clarifies which elements of copyright law are under
discussion. As noted above, this Article will not address the issue
of copyright infringement by individual users, but rather will focus
on the question of enforcement as regards network intermediaries:
Internet service providers and site and service operators, who
generally fall under the statutory definition of providers of
“interactive computer service[s]”41 or online service providers
(“OSPs”).42 While this distinction will shift our focus towards
secondary liability more than primary liability for infringement,
both types of liability will be discussed below.43
A. Identifying Infringement
Copyright in the digital age faced initial challenges in defining
what constituted copying, given the potentially transient nature of

40

See id.
See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2) (2006) (“The term ‘interactive computer service’
means any information service, system, or access software provider that provides or
enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a
service or system that provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or
services offered by libraries or educational institutions.”).
42
17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(A) (“the term ‘service provider’ means an entity offering the
transmission, routing or providing of connections for digital online communications,
between or among points specified by a user, of material of the user’s choosing, without
modification of the content of the material as sent or received.”).
43
Additionally, this Article will not discuss the first prong of copyright infringement
analysis—whether the plaintiff owns a valid copyright for the work in question—as this
is often assumed or uncontested in cases such as those discussed herein, and, even when
contested, is part of the analysis regardless of the medium or method of the alleged
infringement.
41
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digitally stored content, compared to analog or hard-copy storage.
Around the time that the Internet was becoming available to the
public, the Ninth Circuit decided MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak
Computer, Inc.,44 a key case in digital copyright jurisprudence.
MAI Systems addressed the question of whether RAM copies of
computer software, created automatically by the software so that it
could be run, constitute copying for the purposes of copyright
infringement.45 Peak was in the business of servicing computer
systems, and MAI computers accounted for more than half of
Peak’s business.46
The Ninth Circuit, reviewing the district court’s grant of an
injunction against defendant Peak, looked to the definitions found
in the Copyright Act.47 The Copyright Act defines “copies” as:
material objects, other than phonorecords, in which
a work is fixed by any method now known or later
developed, and from which the work can be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated,
either directly or with the aid of a machine or
device.48
The Copyright Act then explains:
A work is “fixed” in a tangible medium of
expression when its embodiment in a copy or
phonorecord, by or under the authority of the
author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit
it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated for a period of more than transitory
duration.49
Peak contested the district court’s finding that the copies of
MAI software that were created in the computers’ memory
(“RAM”) while Peak was servicing MAI computers were “fixed,”
as defined in the Copyright Act.50 Both the district court and the
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993).
Id. at 517.
Id. at 513.
Id. at 517–18 (citations omitted); see also 17 U.S.C. § 101.
17 U.S.C. § 101.
Id.
MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993).
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Ninth Circuit, however, held that the copy created in RAM
satisfied the statutory definition of an impermissible copy.51
Neither court fully engaged the question of what constitutes a
“period of more than transitory duration,”52 which is a key
question for digital and online copyright enforcement, and is a
point with which later courts have taken issue.53
The MAI Systems view of copying in the digital world was
applied to the online world two years later in Religious Technology
Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc.54
Notably, MAI Systems, as a Ninth Circuit decision, was binding
precedent on the Netcom court in California,55 but it was also the
dominant pronouncement at the time on the construction of
copyright law as applied to computers and digital technology. In
Netcom, owners of copyrights in the works of L. Ron Hubbard,
science-fiction writer and founder of the Church of Scientology,
sought a judgment of infringement against a former minister of
Scientology, Dennis Erlich, who was posting materials to the
alt.religion.scientology (“a.r.s.”) Usenet newsgroup; the owner of
the bulletin board system (“BBS”) that hosted a.r.s., to which the
minister was posting portions of the copyrighted works; and the
Internet service providers used by the BBS operator to make his
system accessible to Internet users.56
Relying on MAI Systems, the Netcom court held that, “there is
no question . . . that ‘copies’ were created, as Erlich’s act of
sending a message to a.r.s. caused reproductions of portions of
plaintiffs’ works on both [BBS operator] Klemesrud’s and [ISP]
Netcom’s storage devices.”57 Here, the issue was not whether the
copies were sufficiently fixed—the court held that: “Even though
the messages remained on their systems for at most eleven days,
51

Id.
Id.
53
See, e.g., Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 127 (2d Cir.
2008) (discussing and distinguishing the MAI Systems court’s analysis of the “fixation”
issue).
54
907 F. Supp. 1361, 1365 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (“This case concerns an issue of first
impression regarding intellectual property rights in cyberspace.”).
55
Id. at 1368.
56
Id. at 1365–66.
57
Id. at 1368.
52
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they were sufficiently ‘fixed’ to constitute recognizable copies
under the Copyright Act”58—but rather whether the BBS and ISP
were liable for the mere presence of copies “automatically made on
their computers using their software as part of a process initiated
by a third party.”59
The court declined to adopt the plaintiffs’ argument advocating
liability for direct infringement on the part of the BBS and ISP:
“[I]t does not make sense to adopt a rule that could lead to the
liability of countless parties whose role in the infringement is
nothing more than setting up and operating a system that is
necessary for the functioning of the Internet.”60 The court took a
kinder view of the plaintiffs’ arguments regarding secondary
liability, both contributory and vicarious. Contributory “[l]iability
for participation in the infringement will be established where the
defendant, ‘with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces,
causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of
another.’”61 The court allowed for the possibility that the ISP
could be liable for contributory infringement if the plaintiffs could
prove that the ISP had timely knowledge of the infringement.62
The court also found that the plaintiffs had raised a genuine
issue of fact in the first prong of the vicarious liability test: whether
the defendant “has the right and ability to control the infringer’s
acts.”63 The dispute here concerned Netcom’s alleged ability, or
professed inability, to screen messages or curtail user activity in a
sufficiently precise fashion so that such policing would only affect
users violating Netcom’s terms of use, which prohibited copyright
infringement.64 However, the court held that Netcom, as a fixed58

Id.
Id.
60
Id. at 1372.
61
Id. at 1373 (citation omitted).
62
Id. at 1374–75. The court did not reach the ultimate question of whether Netcom
had knowledge of the infringement since the issue was before the court on motions for
summary judgment. The court concluded that, “there may be a question of fact as to
whether Netcom knew or should have known that such activities were infringing,” and
when it gained that knowledge. Id.
63
Id. at 1375.
64
Id. at 1375–76. As with the issue of Netcom’s knowledge under the contributory
liability test, the court here was limited in its ability to reach the ultimate question
because the matter was before the court on motions for summary judgment.
59
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fee service provider, failed to satisfy the second prong of the
vicarious liability test because it did not enjoy a direct financial
benefit from Erlich’s infringement.65
The secondary liability tests discussed in Netcom set the stage
for much of the online copyright enforcement jurisprudence that
followed, and will be essential to our analysis of the copyright
enforcement challenges posed by cloud computing as ISPs and
other interactive computer systems providers become ever more
important to the day-to-day operations of computing at all levels.
In Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena,66 the court held a defendant
BBS operator directly liable for violating the plaintiff’s exclusive
rights “to distribute copies . . . of the copyrighted work to the
public” and “in the case of . . . pictorial . . . works . . . to display
the copyrighted work publicly,”67 even though the defendant
contended that he did not upload any of the infringing images to
the system himself and did not necessarily know that they were
available via his BBS.68 Regarding the defendant’s knowledge of
the direct infringement, the court held that “[i]ntent to infringe is
not needed to find copyright infringement. Intent or knowledge is
not an element of infringement, and thus even an innocent
infringer is liable for infringement . . . .”69
Relying on this language, the Netcom plaintiffs argued that
Netcom, too, should be held liable for direct infringement despite
its purported lack of knowledge.70 However, the Netcom court
held that the intent or knowledge rule stated in Playboy was
limited to allegations of direct infringement of the distribution
right, “where liability exists regardless of whether the defendant
makes copies.”71 The Netcom plaintiffs only indirectly alleged a
violation of their distribution rights, found in 17 U.S.C. § 106(3),
that the court chose briefly to address.72 The court held that
65

Id. at 1376–77.
839 F. Supp. 1552, 1555 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
67
See id. at 1555 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 106(3), (5) (2006)).
68
Id. at 1559.
69
Id.
70
Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361,
1370 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
71
Id.
72
Id. at 1370–71.
66
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Playboy was “factually distinguishable” on this point because
Netcom did not store files for distribution.73 It concluded that:
[f]inding such a service liable would involve an
unreasonably broad construction of public
distribution and display rights. No purpose would
be served by holding liable those who have no
ability to control the information to which their
subscribers have access, even though they might be
in some sense helping to achieve the Internet's
automatic “public distribution” and the users’
“public” display of files.74
The § 106(3) claim reappeared in later plaintiffs’ allegations,
but ultimately was superseded by the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act,75 (“DMCA”) which “ruled out [liability] for
passive, automatic acts engaged in through a technological process
initiated by another . . .” thus “codif[ying] the result in . . .
Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication
Services, Inc.”76
B. Fair Use
After defining the relevant terms and enumerating the bundle
of rights conferred by ownership of a valid copyright, the
Copyright Act lists a number of limitations and definitions of
scope: cases where infringement can be proven, but in which the
defendant will not be liable under the Act.77 For the purposes of
this discussion, the “fair use” exception found in 17 U.S.C. § 107
is the most relevant of these limitations, because it exempts
apparent instances of infringement from being the basis for
73

Id. at 1372.
Id.
75
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. 105–304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998). The
Digital Millennium Copyright Act also ruled out future MAI Systems-type claims. Title
III, Computer Maintenance Competition Assurance Act, amended 17 U.S.C. § 117 to
enable those repairing computers to make certain temporary, limited copies while
working on a computer. See 17 U.S.C. § 117(c) (2006).
76
ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Cmtys., Inc., 239 F.3d 619, 622 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing
Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D.
Cal. 1995)).
77
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 107–22.
74
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The section defines the exception in arguably broad

Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and
106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work . . . , for
purposes such as criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching . . . , scholarship, or research, is
not an infringement of copyright. In determining
whether the use made of a work in any particular
case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall
include—
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used
in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market
for or value of the copyrighted work.78
Both the purposes and factors enumerated in the statute have
been judicially construed as illustrative and advisory, rather than
exhaustive. “Section 107 contemplates that the question of
whether a given use of copyrighted material is ‘fair’ requires a
case-by-case analysis in which the statutory factors are not ‘treated
in isolation’ but are ‘weighed together, in light of the purposes of
copyright.’”79 For example, while quoting from a book for the
purposes of a book review will generally be found to be a fair use
of copyrighted material, publishing a lengthy quote from the most
interesting part of a new, not-yet-released book probably will not.80
Though a commercial purpose, as contemplated by the first
factor, weighs against a finding of fair use, such a determination is
not dispositive. In analyzing whether a use can claim protection
behind § 107, courts have looked to whether the challenged use is

78

17 U.S.C. § 107.
A.V. v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630, 638 (4th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
80
See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 539–40
(1985).
79
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“transformative,” a concept triumphed by District Court Judge
Pierre Leval in his highly-influential81 1990 article:
I believe the answer to the question of justification
turns primarily on whether, and to what extent, the
challenged use is transformative. The use must be
productive and must employ the quoted matter in a
different manner or for a different purpose from the
original. A quotation of copyrighted material that
merely repackages or republishes the original is
unlikely to pass the test; in Justice Story’s words, it
would merely “supersede the objects” of the
original. If, on the other hand, the secondary use
adds value to the original—if the quoted matter is
used as raw material, transformed in the creation of
new information, new aesthetics, new insights and
understandings—this is the very type of activity that
the fair use doctrine intends to protect for the
enrichment of society.82
This idea has particular traction in the digital world, where all
content can ultimately be reduced to bytes and the word
“transformative” takes on a uniquely technological flair.83
Importantly, however, fair use operates only at the periphery of
copyright enforcement in the cloud because it is an exception to
the primary act of infringement, not a separate defense against
allegations of secondary infringement.
Accordingly, the
intermediaries primarily discussed herein cannot make use of the
fair use defense, except to the extent that they are confronted with
direct infringement claims in addition to claims for secondary
81

Ben Sheffner, Sony v. Tenenbaum: There Are Limits to Fair Use Defense in
Copyright Infringement Cases, 18 WASH. LEGAL FOUND. No. 25 (Oct. 9, 2009), available
at http://www.wlf.org/Upload/legalstudies/legalopinionletter/100909Sheffner_LOL.pdf.
82
Pierre N. Leval, Commentary, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV.
1105, 1111 (1990).
83
See, e.g., iParadigms, 562 F.3d at 640 (holding that defendant’s digital archiving of
plaintiffs’ school papers for a software system designed to detect plagiarism was
sufficiently transformative in purpose and use to constitute “fair use”). But see UMG
Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.Com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (rejecting
defendant’s contention that it was effecting a transformative use of “space shifting” by
eliminating users’ needs for physical CD copies of their music collections).
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infringement. Most of these latter claims, however, will be
avoided under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, as noted
above.84
C. Digital Millennium Copyright Act
The DMCA, passed and signed into law in October 1998,
codified two World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”)
treaties into United States law. For purposes of this discussion, our
focus is Title II, Limitations on Liability Relating to Material
Online,85 codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512. Section 512 limits liability
for online service providers (“OSPs”) in certain circumstances. It
also includes procedures by which OSPs and ISPs can avail
themselves of a “safe harbor” against liability for secondary
copyright infringement.86 Section 512 limits the liability of service
providers in four situations, if certain conditions are met. Service
providers are not liable:
for infringement of copyright by reason of the
provider’s transmitting, routing, or providing
connections for, material through a system or
network controlled or operated by or for the service
provider, or by reason of the intermediate and
transient storage of that material in the course of
such
transmitting,
routing,
or
providing
87
connections.
This immunity is contingent on the service provider interacting
with the material only to the extent absolutely necessary for the
transmission to occur, by request of a third party to that third
party’s designated recipients, and not storing copies of the material
transmitted for longer than absolutely necessary.88 For the
purposes of § 512(a)—describing transitory digital network
communications—“service provider” is defined as “an entity
offering the transmission, routing, or providing of connections for
digital online communications, between or among points specified
84
85
86
87
88

See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006).
Id.
Id. § 512(a).
Id. § 512(a)(1)–(5).
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by a user, of material of the user’s choosing, without modification
to the content of the material as sent or received.”89 This definition
encompasses ISPs, such as America Online and Comcast, in their
traditional role of relaying digital packets from one server on the
Internet to another.90
For all other parts of § 512, a “service provider” is defined as
“a provider of online services or network access, or the operator of
facilities therefor” and includes all entities encompassed by the
previous, narrower definition.91 Applications to which this broader
definition applies include:
System caching: Service providers generally are not
liable as a result of “intermediate and temporary
storage of material on a system or network
controlled or operated by or for the service
provider. . . .” 92 This is an essential function in the
provision of most online services and network
access, so § 512(b) is largely protecting behavior
that is needed for the Internet to operate.
Information residing on systems or networks at
direction of users (or, “Hosting” services93):
Service providers generally are not liable as a result
of “the storage at the direction of a user of material
that resides on a system or network controlled or
operated by or for the service provider . . . .”94 As
will be discussed below, this subsection is of critical
importance to Web 2.0 service providers whose
business models rely on user-generated content.95
These service providers must, however, be vigilant
89

Id. § 512(k)(1)(A).
See, e.g., JONATHAN E. NUECHTERLEIN & PHILIP J. WEISER, DIGITAL CROSSROADS:
AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN THE INTERNET AGE 42–44 (2005)
(describing how packet-switched networks operate); see also POST, supra note 29, at 80–
89.
91
17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(B).
92
Id. § 512(b).
93
CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW § 9.03, at 794 (6th ed. 2003).
94
17 U.S.C. § 512(c).
95
See infra Part III.
90
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in meeting the conditions set forth in § 512(c) and
elsewhere in § 512 in order to avail themselves of
the statutory safe harbor.
Information location tools: Service providers
generally are not liable for “referring or linking
users to an online location containing infringing
material or infringing activity, by using information
location tools, including a directory, index,
reference, pointer, or hypertext link . . . .”96 As with
§ 512(b), subsection (d) serves largely to immunize
a fundamental behavior of the Internet, and
certainly of the World Wide Web, which is built on
a system of links and pointers.
Many of the recent cases in this area hinge on § 512 and
service providers’ fidelity to its protections and conditions.97 As a
threshold matter, none of the protections of § 512 are available to a
service provider if it fails to comply with subsection (i):
The limitations on liability established by this
section shall apply to a service provider only if the
service provider . . . has adopted and reasonably
implemented, and informs subscribers and account
holders of the service provider’s system or network
of, a policy that provides for the termination in
appropriate circumstances of subscribers and
account holders of the service provider’s system or
network who are repeat infringers.98
While subsections (a) and (b) focus on purely technical
behaviors and do not condition the immunity on lack of
knowledge,99 subsections (c) and (d) require that the service
96

17 U.S.C. § 512(d).
See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. CV 04-9484 AHM (SHx), 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 75071 (C.D. Cal. July 26, 2010).
98
17 U.S.C. § 512(i).
99
See Id. § 512(a)–(b) (providing that liability limitations apply to service providers if
certain acts/criteria are met ranging from the service provider not initiating the
transmission to it not being involved with the selection of the transmission of infringing
material, none of which expressly address immunity on the basis of lack of knowledge).
97
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provider lack “actual knowledge” that the material or activity using
the material is infringing.100 Subsection (d) codifies a combination
of the contributory and vicarious liability standards discussed
above: the service provider must lack actual or constructive
knowledge, and also must not receive a direct financial benefit
from the infringing material.101
Subsection (c) features the more robust and better known
“notice and takedown” procedures, with which service providers
must comply to avail themselves of the “safe harbor.” Addressing
the operation of hosting services, subsection (c) requires that
service providers designate an agent, who will receive all
notifications of infringement directed to the service provider.102
Failure to comply with this requirement in a timely fashion can
cost a service provider its ability to rely on § 512 as a defense to
secondary infringement liability.103 To be effective, the notice
must comply with § 512(c)(3), and the provider must respond to an
effective notice according to its policy, as discussed above,
pursuant to § 512(i).104 The precise contours of these requirements
and protections continue to play out in litigation, particularly
where cloud computing services of one form or another are
concerned.
III. RECENT COPYRIGHT JURISPRUDENCE IN THE CLOUD
Having established the context in which questions of copyright
enforcement in cloud computing are presented, we will now
examine some recent cases that have confronted these issues and
derive from them what we can expect from courts and relevant
parties in the future.
100
See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)–(d) (expressly providing that service providers should not be
liable if there is no actual knowledge or awareness of infringing material).
101
Id. § 512(d)(1)–(2).
102
Id. § 512(c)(2).
103
See, e.g., Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc Solutions, Inc., No. C07-03952,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85266, at *23–24 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2010) (noting that “a
service provider cannot be eligible for the safe harbor provisions of the DMCA until ‘the
service provider has designated an agent to receive notifications of claimed
infringement’” (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(2))).
104
See 17 U.S.C. § 512(i).
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Service providers have been availing themselves of the DMCA
safe harbor provisions, found in § 512(c), for more than a
decade.105 Some recent cases illustrate the current contours of the
protection and the level of compliance necessary to take advantage
of that protection. The almost-defunct106 online video site, Veoh,
recently won a trio of decisions upholding its § 512(c) defense
against contributory infringement.107 Veoh’s service, which was
substantially similar to Google’s YouTube,108 is effectively a video
application using the SaaS model of cloud computing—users
interact with the service through their web browser software, but
the video processing all takes place on Veoh’s computers, using
Veoh’s software.109

105

See, e.g., CoStar Grp., Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 556 (4th Cir. 2004); see
also UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1118 (C.D.
Cal. 2009).
106
See, e.g., Ty McMahan, Veoh Lives On—Behind the Acquisition of the Video Site,
WSJ.COM DIGITS BLOG (Apr. 8, 2010, 9:06 A.M.), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/
2010/04/08/veoh-lives-on-behind-the-acquisition-of-the-video-site (“It wasn’t technically
Veoh Networks Inc.’s final hour, rather its final two hours, when a relatively unknown
start-up with no revenue stepped in to acquire the heavily capitalized online video
company.”); see also Antony Bruno, Veoh Closing Down, UMG Lawsuit Blamed,
BILLBOARD.BIZ (Feb. 11, 2010), http://www.billboard.biz/bbbiz/content_display/
industry/e3i550e90cd48d89b8c0504928f5c1c244e (“Online video sharing site Veoh is
going out of business. The AllThingsD blog says it cut the entire staff yesterday and a
bankruptcy filing is expected soon.”); Peter Kafka, Universal Music Group Didn’t Help
Veoh, but it Didn’t Kill it, ALLTHINGSDIGITAL: MEDIA MEMO (Feb. 11, 2010, 4:25 P.M.),
http://mediamemo.allthingsd.com/20100211/universal-music-group-didnt-help-veoh-butit-didnt-kill-it (“The music label’s suit made it very difficult for Veoh to climb out of the
deep hole it found itself in last year. But it was the Web video start-up, not Universal,
that dug that pit.”).
107
UMG Recordings, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1118; UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh
Networks, Inc., 620 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1092 (C.D. Cal. 2008); Io Grp., Inc. v. Veoh
Networks, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1155 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
108
See About YouTube, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/t/about (last visited Oct.
14, 2010) (“Founded in February 2005, YouTube is the world’s most popular online
video community, allowing millions of people to discover, watch and share originallycreated videos. YouTube provides a forum for people to connect, inform, and inspire
others across the globe and acts as a distribution platform for original content creators
and advertisers large and small.”).
109
See Io Grp., 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1139–40 (describing the automated uploading
process used by Veoh, where, after a user would submit a video on Veoh’s website,
Veoh’s systems would convert each video into Flash format and perform other automated
tasks to make them searchable and available to other users).
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In the first of these three decisions, Io Group v. Veoh, the court
found that Veoh complied with all of the requirements of § 512.110
Io Group, an adult entertainment company, sought an infringement
judgment against Veoh based on copyrighted adult videos that
Veoh users had uploaded to the site.111 Rather than following the
“notice and takedown” provisions of the DMCA, and engaging
Veoh’s DMCA-compliant policy, Io Group provided Veoh with no
notice of the infringing content prior to commencing its suit.112 By
the time the suit was filed, however, Veoh had independently
decided to remove all adult video content from its site,
coincidentally including any content that formed the basis for Io
Group’s infringement claims.113
The court reviewed Veoh’s policies, both with respect to its
user-facing terms of use and acceptable usage policy and with an
eye towards DMCA compliance.114 After a step-by-step review of
§ 512’s requirements, the court concluded that Veoh qualified for
the safe harbor protections, despite Io Group’s attempts to chip
away at Veoh’s policies and practices.115 The court also noted its
displeasure with Io Group’s avoidance of the “notice and
takedown” process, given Veoh’s apparent receptiveness to play
within the DMCA’s rules.116
The other decisions in Veoh’s favor came in a case brought by
UMG Recordings, whose sound recordings and music
compositions could be heard in videos, including UMG-produced
110

Id. at 1141.
Id. at 1136.
112
Id. at 1137.
113
Id.
114
Id. at 1137–38.
115
Id. at 1141–55. The court considered and rejected Io Group’s argument that Veoh
should fall outside of the safe harbor because of the apparent ease with which rogue users
can regain access to the service after expulsion for infringement, which is a current
source of tension in ongoing policy debates about copyright reform. The court cited the
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1111 (9th Cir.
2007) for the proposition that the DMCA states, “A service provider reasonably
implements its repeat infringer policy if it terminates users when ‘appropriate.’ Section
512(i) itself does not clarify when it is ‘appropriate’ for service providers to act. It only
requires that a service provider terminate users who are ‘repeat infringers.’” (internal
citation omitted).
116
Id. at 1148–50.
111
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music videos, uploaded by third-party users to the Veoh service.117
Veoh asserted its DMCA safe harbor defense, on the same grounds
as it did in Io Group.118 In the first of the two relevant decisions in
this case, UMG moved for summary judgment to block Veoh’s
assertion of its DMCA defense.119 The court focused on the
technical processes by which the videos were manipulated, stored
and accessed using Veoh’s system. In particular, the decision
discussed four software functions, which UMG claimed pulled
Veoh outside § 512’s protections: “(1) the reproduction of works
through the creation of Flash versions of uploaded videos; (2) the
reproduction of works through the creation of ‘chunked’ copies of
uploaded videos; (3) the public performance of works when users
access videos via streaming; (4) the distribution of works when
users access videos via downloading.”120
The court ultimately held that the limitations on liability found
in § 512(c) apply to these software functions when they are
employed for the purpose of facilitating access to user-stored
material.121 The court accepted as correct Veoh’s argument, based
in the language of § 512(c), that the statute presupposes that
service providers will facilitate users’ access to the material and
that the purpose of processing done by the service provider need
not merely be storage.122 While this decision did not discuss
“volitional conduct” in those terms, the analysis proceeds along
similar lines.123 Veoh argued that § 512’s protections are not
limited only to those functions that constitute storage at the user’s
request, but also encompass those activities necessary to
accomplish storage.124 The court agreed, holding that “the
infringing conduct must occur as a result of the storage.”125 While
117

UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 620 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1082 (C.D.
Cal. 2008).
118
Id. at 1091.
119
Id. at 1082.
120
Id. at 1088.
121
Id. at 1092 (“The four software functions that UMG challenges fall within the scope
of § 512(c), because all of them are narrowly directed toward providing access to
material stored at the direction of users.”).
122
Id. at 1088–89.
123
See Page, supra note 11 and accompanying text; Naone, supra note 12.
124
UMG Recordings, 620 F. Supp. 2d at 1088.
125
Id.
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this was a matter of statutory interpretation of the DMCA, rather
than a broader reading of copyright, it follows that the distinction
is whether Veoh’s actions stem directly—and automatically—from
the user’s volitional conduct of either uploading a video for storage
using Veoh’s infrastructure or accessing the video to view on
Veoh’s system.126
Having lost in its attempt to block Veoh’s DMCA safe harbor
defense, UMG next tried to attack Veoh’s compliance, in much the
same way as Io Group did.127 Indeed, the court here explicitly
cited the Io Group holding, titling that section of its decision,
“Prior Finding in Io Group that Veoh is entitled to the Section
512(c) Safe Harbor.”128 As in Io Group, the court here addressed
each component of the safe harbor step by step, finding at each
point that Veoh was in compliance to the extent required by law.129
However, in a recently filed appeal to the Ninth Circuit, UMG
is challenging the district court’s grant of summary judgment.130
At the heart of the appeal is UMG’s argument that “the copyright
rules that apply to online content companies like Veoh aren’t all
that different from those that apply offline, regardless of what the
DMCA says.”131 Much of the brief repeats the arguments rebuffed
by Judge Matz in the district court and criticizes his decisions.132
Additionally, UMG challenges the characterization of Veoh’s
126

The court said as much in its analysis:
Common sense and widespread usage establish that “by reason of”
means “as a result of” or “something that can be attributed to . . . .”
So understood, when copyrighted content is displayed or distributed
on Veoh it is “as a result of” or “attributable to” the fact that users
uploaded the content to Veoh’s servers to be accessed by other
means.
Id. at 1089.
127
See id. at 1107; Io Grp., Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1154
(N.D. Cal. 2008).
128
UMG Recordings, 620 F. Supp. 2d at 1104.
129
Id. at 1105–1118.
130
Appellants’ Brief at 1, UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., No. 0956777, (9th Cir. June 17, 2010), 2010 WL 3706518 [hereinafter UMG Brief].
131
Joe Mullin, Not Dead Yet: Veoh’s Big Copyright Win Outlives Company, CORP.
COUNSEL
(Apr.
30,
2010),
http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=
1202457430480; see also UMG Brief, supra note 130, at 45 (“The DMCA did not simply
rewrite copyright law for the on-line world.” (citation omitted)).
132
See generally UMG Brief, supra note 130.
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service as equivalent to a web hosting service.133 UMG’s brief
tries to differentiate between a web host, via a browser request,
serving material that it has stored at the direction of a user, and
Veoh’s serving a video stored at the direction of a user,134 but does
not appear to explain it in a way that actually distinguishes them.
Veoh’s reply brief approvingly reviews the district court’s decision
and works step by step through the DMCA safe harbor analysis.135
This appeal deserves attention particularly because it is directed to
the Ninth Circuit, headed by Chief Judge Alex Kozinski, who has
been vocal on Internet and intellectual property law issues.136
The popular video-sharing site YouTube is in the midst of
litigation137 substantially similar to Veoh’s ongoing dispute with
UMG. Content creator Viacom, and related companies, sued
YouTube for copyright infringement based on the presence of
user-uploaded copyrighted videos on the YouTube site.138 The
parties recently engaged in a round of summary judgment motions
focused on the DMCA safe harbor.139 Unsurprisingly, YouTube
cited approvingly to the Veoh decisions, arguing that “[a]n
unbroken line of cases, including recent decisions involving a
video hosting service just like YouTube, confirms that Section
512(c) bars such [infringement] claims.”140 Viacom criticized the
Veoh decisions, but attempted to distinguish them nonetheless,
133

See id. at 43.
See id. at 43–44.
135
See generally Brief of Appellee, UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., No.
09-56777, (9th Cir. June 19, 2010), 2010 WL 3706519.
136
See UMG Brief, supra note 130, at 45; see also Alex Kozinski & Josh Goldfoot, A
Declaration of the Dependence of Cyberspace, 32 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 365, 368 (2009)
(discussing Ninth Circuit, and other, decisions regarding online copyright infringement).
137
Anne Broache & Greg Sandoval, Viacom Sues Google over Youtube Clips, CNET
NEWS (Mar. 13, 2007, 2:14 PM), http://news.cnet.com/Viacom-sues-Google-overYouTube-clips/2100-1030_3-6166668.html.
138
See id.
139
See, e.g., Memorandum of Law in Support of Viacom’s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment on Liability and Inapplicability of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act Safe
Harbor Defense, Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
18, 2010) (No. 07-cv-02103), 2010 WL 1004561 [hereinafter Viacom Brief];
Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Viacom
Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2010) (No. 07-cv02103), 2010 WL 1004562 [hereinafter YouTube Brief].
140
YouTube Brief, supra note 139, at 19.
134
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arguing that YouTube itself committed the infringement, so that
the “right and ability to control” the activity of users is not the
dispositive issue.141
In a thirty-page decision issued in June 2010, Judge Louis
Stanton granted summary judgment to YouTube as to all of
Viacom’s claims for direct and secondary infringement, finding
that “they qualify for the protection of 17 U.S.C. § 512(c).”142
Judge Stanton focused on the knowledge requirement found in §
512(c)(1)(A)(i) and (ii) and, reviewing the legislative history and
recent intellectual property case law, concluded that YouTube did
not have the requisite knowledge to void DMCA safe-harbor
protection and that Viacom’s assertion of culpability by knowledge
of “red flags” was not compatible with the statute.143 He also
distinguished Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster,
Ltd.144 and held that peer-to-peer file-sharing networks are not
covered by § 512(c), finding Viacom’s reliance on Grokster and its
progeny faulty.145 Viacom has appealed and made public
statements anticipating victory at the appellate level.146 Progress in
this case and in the Veoh appeal could set up a Supreme Court
showdown in the near future, perhaps clarifying certain elements
of the DMCA’s safe harbor.
While the legal lessons of the Veoh decisions thus far make it
clear that most service providers, at least those falling under §
512(k)(1)(B), can readily avoid liability by complying with § 512’s
requirements, the broader lesson may not be as clear. As a
relatively small and non-essential service provider, Veoh was in a
good position to manage its users and respond to takedown notices
with the requisite speed and diligence to satisfy the safe harbor
provisions. It seems unlikely that a § 512(k)(1)(A) service
provider—a traditional ISP—could operate quite so nimbly.
Perhaps these services can address most of their needs within §

141

Viacom Brief, supra note 139, at 57–61.
Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 529 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
143
See generally id.
144
545 U.S. 913 (2005).
145
Id. at 525–27.
146
Viacom-YouTube Litigation, VIACOM, INC., http://news.viacom.com/news/Pages/
youtubelitigation.aspx (last visited Nov. 16, 2010).
142
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512(a), but many provide storage capabilities for their users, such
as website hosting and backup file storage, opening them up to the
protections, but also the requirements, of § 512(c). Traditional
ISPs, such as Comcast and Verizon, must be cautious to comply
with notice-and-takedown procedures with respect to their hosting
features lest they find themselves the subjects of secondary
infringement actions.147
A recent summary judgment decision148 against the owner of
several BitTorrent websites stands in marked contrast to Veoh’s
repeated victories.149 Applying the Grokster150 Court’s holdings
on inducement, the court in Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v.
147

Comcast provides two gigabytes of storage to all high-speed Internet customers.
High Speed Internet, COMCAST, http://security.comcast.net/constantguard (last visited
Feb. 15, 2011). Additionally, Comcast advertises its service as the “easier way to back
up and share your valuable files.” Id. Verizon offers residential customers “personal
Web space,” with the ability to “build your own blog, business site or Web page.”
Verizon High Speed Internet, VERIZON, http://www22.verizon.com/Residential/
HighSpeedInternet/Features/Features.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2011).
148
See Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., v. Fung, No. CV 06-5578 SVW(JCx), 2009 WL
6355911 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2009).
149
BitTorrent, as a protocol, provides its own challenges to copyright enforcement:
BitTorrent is a protocol (a set of rules and description of how to do
things) allowing you to download files quickly by allowing people
downloading the file to upload (distribute) parts of it at the same
time. BitTorrent is often used for distribution of very large files, very
popular files and files available for free, as it is a lot cheaper, faster
and more efficient to distribute files using BitTorrent than a regular
download.
What is BitTorrent, BITTORRENT, http://www.bittorrent.com/btusers/what-is-bittorrent
(last visited Oct. 9, 2010). A recent census of files shared via BitTorrent found that about
99% of files being shared were infringing copyrights. See, e.g., Ed Felten, Census of Files
Available via BitTorrent, FREEDOM TO TINKER (Jan. 29, 2010, 10:45 AM),
http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/felten/census-files-available-bittorrent (“Overall,
we classified ten of the 1021 files, or approximately 1%, as likely non-infringing, this
result should be interpreted with caution, as we may have missed some non-infringing
files, and our sample is of files available, not files actually downloaded. Still, the result
suggests strongly that copyright infringement is widespread among BitTorrent users.”);
see also Jacqui Cheng, BitTorrent Census: About 99% of Files Copyright Infringing, ARS
TECHNICA (Jan. 29, 2010, 1:08 PM), http://arstechnica.com/media/news/2010/01/
bittorrent-census-about-99-of-files-copyright-infringing.ars (“[A]lthough there are
caveats to his findings, they highlight the relationship DRM has with illegal file sharing.
As in: the more DRM there is on the legit versions of the content, the more popular it is
on P2P.”).
150
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
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Fung151 held that inducement to infringement would vitiate a § 512
safe harbor defense: “inducement liability and the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act safe harbors are inherently
contradictory.”152 The court further held that Fung’s inducement
obviated the need for a full explication of the contributory and
vicarious liability tests.153 Here, the world of users was potentially
larger and certainly more unruly than that which faced Veoh, but
Fung’s affirmative conduct to induce and assist copyright
infringement took him well outside the intended use of § 512’s
safe harbors.154
The Fung court stepped through the Grokster analysis,
beginning by distinguishing the underlying technology:
In a BitTorrent network . . . the download process is
unique from that of previous systems such as
Napster and Grokster. Rather than downloading a
file from an individual user, users of a bit-torrent
network will select the file that they wish to
download, and, at that point, the downloading will
begin from a number of host computers that possess
the file simultaneously.155
Another underlying distinction between Fung’s sites and the
Grokster system is that a user did not search Fung’s sites for
infringing files themselves, but rather for links to “dot-torrent”
files that would then allow the user to begin downloading the
sought-after file from multiple users.156

151

No. CV 06-5578 SVW(JCx), 2009 WL 6355911 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2009).
Id. at *18.
153
See id. at *15 (“Having determined that Defendants are liable under an inducement
theory for their users’ infringing activities, the Court refrains from addressing Plaintiff’s
Motion for Summary Judgment on the theories of material contributory infringement and
vicarious infringement.”).
154
See id. at *5.
155
Id. at *2.
156
See id. at *2–3.
The advantage of BitTorrent technology is the cumulative nature of
its downloading and economies of scale. As more users download a
given file, there are more sources for the file pieces necessary for
others. This process, whereby individuals [may] be uploading and/or
downloading from many sources at any given time is known as a
152
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Moving on to its analysis of the plaintiffs’ claims, the court
opted only to address the claim of inducement of copyright
infringement, holding that “[d]efendants’ inducement liability is
overwhelmingly clear.”157 Noting that material contribution to
copyright infringement and inducement are collectively referred to
as “contributory liability,”158 the court looked to Grokster to
explain the distinction: “Generally, inducement requires that the
defendant has undertaken purposeful acts aimed at assisting and
encouraging others to infringe copyright,”159 while material
contribution requires that the defendant “has actual knowledge that
specific infringing material is available using its system.”160
The theory of inducement, articulated in Justice Souter’s
Grokster opinion, looks to both the intent and affirmative actions
of the defendant to determine liability: “one who distributes a
device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as
shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster
infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by
third parties.”161 Further, specific acts of infringement need not be
proven to have been induced if a defendant’s overall objective is
deemed “patently illegal” by a court.162 There is no exclusive basis
for such an inference by the court,163 but rather the Grokster Court
suggested several possible activities that could lead to this
inference, including the classic instance of inducement by
“advertisement or solicitation that broadcasts a message designed
to stimulate others to commit violations.”164

“swarm.” This prevents a backlog of users waiting to download from
one individual user with the source file.
Id.
157

Id. at *6.
Id. at *7 (citing Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv., Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788, 795 (9th
Cir. 2007)).
159
Fung, 2009 WL 6355911, at *7 (citing Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v.
Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936–37 (2005)).
160
Fung, 2009 WL 6355911, at *7 (citation omitted).
161
Grokster, 545 U.S. at 936–37.
162
Id. at 941.
163
Fung, 2009 WL 6355911, at *10.
164
Grokster, 545 U.S. at 937.
158
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The Fung court found that plaintiffs had demonstrated several
categories of inducement by defendants.165 Defendant Fung
created a category and corresponding page on his IsoHunt site
dedicated to “Box Office Movies,” encouraging users to identify
BitTorrent files that would allow other users illegally to upload
copies of the twenty highest-grossing films then playing in the
United States.166 Defendants provided other browseable categories
to ease the process for users looking for specific types of infringing
content.167 Defendants argued that these lists either originated
from users or were the result of “automated processes that simply
reflect user activity.”168 Taking a different view of the volitional
conduct issue than the court in Sony Corporation of America v.
Universal City Studios, Inc.,169 or the Second Circuit in Cartoon
Network LP v. CSC Holdings,170 the Fung court held that:
Defendants’ assertions ignore the material fact that
Defendants designed the websites and included a
feature that collects users’ most commonly
searched-for titles. The fact that these lists almost
exclusively contained copyrighted works and that
Defendants never removed these lists is probative of
Defendants’ knowledge of ongoing infringement
and failure to stop this infringement.171
This activity by defendants stands in stark contrast to the
“substantial noninfringing uses” found in Sony172 and Cartoon
Network.173 As in Grokster,174 the Fung court found several

165
Fung, 2009 WL 6355911, at *11–15. These categories, enumerated as section
headings, include: “Defendants’ message to users,” “Defendants’ assistance to users
engaging in infringement,” “Defendants’ implementation of technical features promoting
copyright infringement,” “Defendants’ business model depends on massive infringing
use,” and Defendants’ willful blindness (“[O]strich-like refusal to discover the extent to
which its system was being used to infringe copyright”). Id. at *15.
166
Id. at *11.
167
Id.
168
Id.
169
464 U.S. 417, 437–38 (1984).
170
536 F.3d 121, 130–31 (2d Cir. 2008).
171
Fung, 2009 WL 6355911, at *11.
172
Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.
173
Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 133 (2d Cir. 2008).
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instances of direct statements by Fung encouraging infringement,
and attempting to justify it as a proper activity.175 The court also
accepted evidence that Fung directly assisted users when they had
difficulty locating or accessing infringing material.176
The
defendants’ sites, like those in Grokster, were funded primarily by
advertising revenue, and the evidence introduced by the plaintiffs
clearly showed that the search for and acquisition of infringing
content was the dominant reason for users to visit the sites and
view the advertising.177
The court then turned to the Fung defendants’ asserted DMCA
defenses, focusing on § 512(d)’s “information location tools”
provision.178 The court’s introduction to this section, while it did
not bode well for defendants, is a helpful articulation of the
DMCA:
In many ways, the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act is simply a restatement of the legal standards
establishing secondary copyright infringement—in
many cases, if a defendant is liable for secondary
infringement, the defendant is not entitled to Digital
Millennium Copyright Act immunity; if a defendant
is not liable for secondary infringement, the
defendant is entitled to Digital Millennium
Copyright Act immunity. The two sets of rules do
not entirely overlap, but this framework is helpful

174

Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 937–40
(2005).
175
Fung, 2009 WL 6355911, at *12.
176
Id. The court also noted, briefly, that the statements themselves are not the
prohibited activity, but rather serve as evidence of intent to induce. Id. at 13. That said,
the court cites authority that such statements are not protected by the First Amendment:
“The first amendment does not provide a defense to a criminal charge simply because the
actor uses words to carry out his illegal purpose. Crimes . . . frequently involve the use of
speech as part of the criminal transaction . . . .” Id. at *14 (quoting United States v.
Barnett, 667 F.2d 835, 842 (9th Cir. 1982)).
177
Id. at *14–15. The court rejected defendant’s contention that the lack of detail in
plaintiffs’ evidence regarding advertising revenue precluded the use of this evidence,
holding that, “the present Motion involves liability not damages, so such detail is
unnecessary.” Id. at *15 n.25.
178
Id. at *15–18.
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for understanding the Act’s statutory text and
structure.179
In short, the DMCA will be of little help to a defendant once
inducement, or another basis for secondary copyright infringement,
has been sufficiently proven. As discussed above, a defendant’s
knowledge and affirmative activities negate each required element
of the safe harbor test.
Summarizing its findings, the court held that the Fung
defendants’ attempts to distinguish their case from Grokster
failed.180 To the defendants’ claim that BitTorrent is different
from the technologies at issue in Grokster, the court held that
BitTorrent “is nothing more than old wine in a new bottle.”181
Cloud computing providers and users should pay heed to this type
of judicial pronouncement because it suggests that attempts to
design a system intended to circumvent the hook of liability—
primary or secondary—could be thwarted if the court views the
underlying elements as substantially similar to existing, reviewed
technology or as having the same improper aims.
Both sides in Viacom v. YouTube cited Fung in their summary
judgment briefs for its discussion of inducement. Viacom uses
Fung at various points to support its application of the Grokster
standards on inducement, a standard requiring less evidence of
affirmative inducement, as a matter of law.182 YouTube makes a
single reference to Fung as a narrative, factual example of
prohibited conduct to illustrate the contrast with its own service.183

179

Id. at *15.
Id. at *19. I will not review the court’s discussion of defendant’s second and third
arguments—(2) that its activities were protected by the First Amendment and (3) that its
users are located around the world and not just in the United States. While I anticipate
that many cloud computing defendants will appeal to the international nature of their user
base, this argument is almost always undone by evidence of domestic infringement or
domestic victims.
181
Id. To the extent it acknowledged a distinction in the technology, the court found
BitTorrent more likely to result in liability. “Defendants’ technologies appear to improve
upon the previous technologies by permitting faster downloads of large files such as
movies. Such an improvement quite obviously increases the potential for copyright
infringement.” Id.
182
Viacom Brief, supra note 139, at 25–26, 47–48, 50, 52, 55, 57, 62.
183
YouTube Brief, supra note 139, at 83.
180

C04_MELZER_20110315 (DO NOT DELETE)

436

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

3/15/2011 5:27 PM

[Vol. 21:403

YouTube continues by arguing that Grokster stands for the
proposition that courts should “reject[] inducement claims against
services that were not designed intentionally to encourage
copyright infringement, even if the services could be used for
infringing purposes.”184 Courts have shown, and litigants accept,
that both intention in system creation and design and ongoing
operating conduct factor into an analysis of the DMCA safe
harbor’s applicability.185 Those engaged in copyright reform
efforts should consider this issue—how these lines are to be
drawn—as ripe for clarification. However, judicial application of
these standards has been fairly consistent, as YouTube and Veoh
have argued in court and in their briefs, thus far successfully.186
Carelessness can also doom a service provider’s attempt to
invoke the safe harbor defense. A recent case involving a website
hosting company illustrates what the failure to consider § 512 in a
timely fashion can do to a defense.187 Defendant Akanoc failed to
designate a § 512(c) agent until four months after the complaint in
this case was filed, thus barring a safe harbor defense.188
Additionally, though unsurprisingly, the court held that there was,
at best, limited evidence of a DMCA compliance policy.189 While
here, as with Veoh, the world of users was limited and reasonable
steps could be taken to prevent infringement (or at the very least
comply with § 512) it is unclear that the rule illustrated in Akanoc
is readily scalable to major web hosts. As policy discussions over
copyright reform continue, a value judgment must be made at
some level as to whether, and under what circumstances, copyright
enforcement justifies stifling or disabling the functionality of key
service providers.
Moving away from the DMCA, Cablevision’s RS-DVR
(remote storage-digital video recorder) provides an interesting look

184

Id.
See Viacom Int’l Inc. v. Youtube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Io
Grp., Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
186
See supra note 168, at 28.
187
Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc Solutions, Inc., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d 1178 (N.D.
Cal. 2010).
188
Id. at 1187.
189
Id.
185
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at one deployment of cloud computing principles in a not-strictlycomputing method. Cablevision was sued by television content
owners for developing a system that allowed users to access
television content stored remotely on centralized servers, operating
as DVRs, owned and controlled by Cablevision. The content
owners ultimately lost and the circuit court decision provides an
important reading of some of the key questions in cloud computing
copyright jurisprudence: namely, whether an infringing copy is
created by all technical processes, who is making the copy and
whether liability arises from creating the instrumentality for the
copy.190 Piggybacking off of the district court’s description of the
RS-DVR system, the court noted that:
“[T]he RS-DVR is not a single piece of equipment,”
but rather “a complex system requiring numerous
computers, processes, networks of cables, and
facilities staffed by personnel twenty-four hours a
day and seven days a week.” To the customer,
however, the processes of recording and playback
on the RS-DVR are similar to that [sic] of a
standard set-top DVR. Using a remote control, the
customer can record programming by selecting a
program in advance from an on-screen guide, or by
pressing the record button while viewing a given
program. A customer cannot, however, record the
earlier portion of a program once it has begun.191
At issue was whether Cablevision engaged in impermissible
copying to operate the RS-DVR system.192
The first question concerned the buffer data; to allow its
subscribers to save programs to their respective RS-DVR accounts,

190

Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 124 (2d Cir. 2008), cert.
denied sub nom. Cable News Network, Inc. v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2890
(2009) (“Critically for our analysis here, plaintiffs alleged theories only of direct
infringement, not contributory infringement, and defendants waived any defense based on
fair use.”).
191
Id. at 125 (citations omitted).
192
Id. at 124.
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Cablevision directed part of its programming stream into a buffer
system.193
“No bit of data remains in any buffer for more than
a fleeting 1.2 seconds. And unlike the data in cases
like MAI Systems, which remained embodied in the
computer’s RAM memory until the user turned the
computer off, each bit of data here is rapidly and
automatically overwritten as soon as it is
processed.”194
Accordingly, the court held that the buffer data, while
satisfying the embodiment prong of fixation under the Copyright
Act, was not fixed for more than a transitory period, failing the
duration requirement.195 This language appears to be protective of
a service provider’s ability to conduct the underlying technical
business of the Internet without fear of infringement liability, even
where the claim is for direct infringement, not secondary. ISPs
could likely make out strong cases that any copying they do, for
the purposes of conveying material to a customer or conveying that
material to storage at the behest of a customer, is sufficiently
fleeting to satisfy a fixation analysis as seen in Cartoon Network.
This is essential to the smooth functioning of the Internet generally
and cloud computing systems specifically.
Addressing the issue of direct liability for the creation of
playback copies, the court read Netcom as a proper gloss on § 106,
rather than merely an expedient and/or outdated decision limited
only to the Internet and ISP context.196 The court focused the issue
by noting that there is a dispute as to the author of the allegedly
infringing copy: Cablevision or the user.197 The court arrived at its
answer by looking to the instances of volitional conduct that led to
the creation of the copy: “There are only two instances of
volitional conduct in this case: Cablevision’s conduct in designing,
housing, and maintaining a system that exists only to produce a
copy, and a customer’s conduct in ordering that system to produce
193
194
195
196
197

Id.
Id. at 129–30.
Id. at 130.
Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 131 (2d Cir. 2008).
Id.
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a copy of a specific program.”198 Ultimately, the court analogized
the RS-DVR to the VCR, holding that the customer’s conduct was
the relevant volitional conduct in creating the copy.199
This, too, is a green light for cloud computing service
providers. To the extent that service providers may be pursued for
direct infringement, the Cartoon Network decision, echoing
Netcom200 and Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City
Studios, Inc.,201 stands for the proposition that system design,
though it may lead to infringement, does not expose the provider or
system designer to a direct infringement claim.
IV. OUTLOOK
Recent case law paints a fairly sunny picture for service
providers in the cloud computing area. So long as they operate
responsibly, within the DMCA’s safe harbors, and avoid actively
inducing infringement, their roles as intermediaries should not
subject them to liability for copyright infringement. Courts have
applied this approach when reviewing the conduct of SaaS
providers, such as Veoh, so the rule should apply all the more to
PaaS and IaaS providers, who arguably have less direct interaction
with and control over the content that their customers place on
their systems, unless the provider induces infringement by its
customers.202
Of course, the corollary is the dark storm clouds that face
content owners as cloud computing expands and more people
continue putting more content into the cloud. The DMCA and the
case law interpreting it place the burden on the copyright owner to
198

Id.
Id.
200
Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361
(N.D. Cal. 1995).
201
464 U.S. 417, 437–38 (1984) (“In such cases, as in other situations in which the
imposition of vicarious liability is manifestly just, the ‘contributory’ infringer was in a
position to control the use of copyrighted works by others and had authorized the use
without permission from the copyright owner. This case, however, plainly does not fall
in that category.”).
202
See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1118
(C.D. Cal. 2009).
199
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identify and pursue infringement via the notice-and-takedown
regime.203
Content owners have described that effort as
“ultimately Sisyphean: because [these sites are] dynamic and
change[] day-to-day or hour-to-hour as users upload more material,
the task of identifying and sending notifications requesting the
removal of copyrighted works would create an unending [version
the children’s] game of ‘Whack-A-Mole.’”204 While judges, as
individuals, may be sympathetic to this argument, current
precedent and understanding of the DMCA suggests that this is the
balance Congress knowingly struck.205
While there are few bright lines in this area, service providers
have a solid understanding of what the law requires of them at this
point, and are therefore able to comply with the DMCA’s safe
harbor provisions. Content owners remain dissatisfied with the
existing system, but do not lack options to pursue legal action
against those directly responsible for infringement.206 That these
options are unpopular with the industries’ consumers is not a
matter for copyright law, though it suggests an attitude towards
copyright in the digital age that should factor into discussions of
reform.
There are some possible changes on the horizon, in the form of
proposed legislation and international agreements. News of the
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (“ACTA”), a multilateral

203

See, e.g., supra notes 98, 109, 113.
UMG Brief, supra note 130, at 55.
205
See, e.g., Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 523 (reviewing
the legislative history of the DMCA and finding that, “[t]he tenor of the foregoing
provisions is that the phrases ‘actual knowledge that the material or an activity’ is
infringing, and ‘facts or circumstances’ indicating infringing activity, describe knowledge
of specific and identifiable infringements of particular individual items. Mere knowledge
of prevalence of such activity in general is not enough.”).
206
See Matt Richtel & Sharon Waxman, The Media Business, Film Studios Prepare
Suits on Illegal Sharing of Files, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2004, http://query.nytimes.com/
gst/fullpage.html?res=9905E2D8143CF936A35752C1A9629C8B63
(“Hollywood’s
major movie studios said yesterday that they would begin filing lawsuits this month
against people who make copyrighted films available for downloading over the
Internet.”); Music Piracy Suit Against N.Y. Family Is Settled for $7,000, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
28, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/28/business/media/ 28piracy.html (“She was
one of thousands of people sued in the Recording Industry Association of America’s
antipiracy campaign . . . .”).
204
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agreement that has been negotiated in secret over the last several
years, started to leak to the public over the year,207 leading to a
public disclosure by the negotiating parties of a draft text.208
During the secret negotiations, one controversial provision that
leaked to the public was a “three strikes” or “graduated response”
policy whereby ISPs would be required to terminate the accounts
of repeat offenders or face liability themselves, a departure from
the DMCA framework discussed above.209
The footnote containing this provision, supported by the United
States and longed for by content owners and their representatives,
is not present in the first publicly released draft, suggesting that it

207

See, e.g., Rob Pegoraro, Copyright Overreach Goes on World Tour, WASH. POST,
Nov. 15, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/13/
AR2009111300852.html (“An international copyright agreement, negotiated under
unusual secrecy, could impose a further round of restrictions on our use of digital
technology. This Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, or ACTA, represents an attempt
by the United States and other countries to set common rules for violations of
intellectual-property laws. The United States hopes to use ACTA to export its laws, but
in the process it might have to import others.”); Eric Pfanner, Quietly, Nations Grapple
With Steps to Quash Fake Goods, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2010, http://query.nytimes.
com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9501E0DA1138F935A25751C0A9669D8B63 (“Behind a veil
of secrecy, the United States, the European Union, Japan and other countries are forging
ahead with plans to coordinate an international crackdown on illegally copied music,
movies, designer bags and other goods that change hands in sidewalk souks and Internet
bazaars.”).
208
CONSOLIDATED TEXT PREPARED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE, ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE
AGREEMENT, available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/april/tradoc_146029
.pdf; see also Nate Anderson, ACTA Arrives (Still Bad, but a Tiny Bit Better), ARS
TECHNICA (Apr. 21, 2010, 4:07 PM) http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2010/04/
acta-is-here.ars [hereinafter ACTA Arrives] (“We’ve been covering the AntiCounterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) for two years now, and in that entire 24 month
period no official text of the agreement has been released. Remarkable, really, given the
intense scrutiny, but there you have it. Today, that all changed as the countries behind
ACTA finally released a consolidated draft text of the agreement.”).
209
See, e.g., David Kravets, ACTA Draft: No Internet for Copyright Scofflaws, WIRED
(Mar. 24, 2010) (citation omitted), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/03/terminatecopyright-scofflaws (“The specific ISP policy suggested in a footnote ‘is providing for
the termination in appropriate circumstances of subscriptions and accounts on the service
provider’s system or network of repeat infringers.’ This so-called ‘three strikes’ or
‘graduated response’ policy, is the holy grail of Internet-copyright enforcement,
staunchly backed by the Motion Picture Association of America and the Recording
Industry Association of America.”).
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is no longer being considered by the negotiators.210 Shortly before
the release of the draft, the European Parliament approved a
resolution stating that it would not support ACTA if it contained
this type of provision.211 A provision like this, which called for
“the termination in appropriate circumstances of subscriptions and
accounts on the service provider’s system or network of repeat
infringers,” would create another liability hook to be used against
ISPs, as failure to terminate repeat offenders would be grounds for
liability in itself.212 The absence of such a provision suggests that,
for the time being, the rules set out in Veoh and Fung regarding
inducement and proper compliance with § 512 will continue to set
the boundaries of the DMCA safe harbor. There is also some
evidence that stricter policing of and by ISPs through the
imposition of a three-strikes law will not be effective in reducing
infringement.213
As a domestic matter, Congress created a new executive
position, the United States Intellectual Property Enforcement
Coordinator (IPEC) under the Office of Management and Budget,
as part of the Prioritizing Resources and Organization for
Intellectual Property Act of 2008.214 The first IPEC, Victoria
Espinel, was appointed in the fall of 2009, and is currently engaged
in a public comment period on the issue of “Coordination and
Strategic Planning of the Federal Effort Against Intellectual

210

ACTA Arrives, supra note 207 (“An earlier footnote found in a leaked draft provided
a single example of such a policy: ‘Providing for termination in appropriate
circumstances of subscriptions and accounts in the service provider’s system or network
of repeat infringers.’ In other words, some variation of ‘three strikes.’ That footnote is
now gone from the text entirely.”).
211
See, e.g., David Kravets, ACTA Backs Away from 3 Strikes, WIRED (Apr. 21, 2010),
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/04/acta-treaty.
212
Id.
213
Nate Anderson, Piracy up in France After Tough Three-Strikes Law Passed, ARS
TECHNICA (Mar. 26, 2010), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2010/03/piracy-upin-france-after-tough-three-strikes-law-passed.ars (“According to a team of French
researchers, online copyright infringement is down on P2P networks—but it’s up in areas
that the law doesn’t cover, such as online streaming and one-click download services like
Rapidshare.”).
214
Office of the U.S. Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator,
WHITEHOUSE.GOV, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/intellectualproperty (last visited
Oct. 4, 2010).

C04_MELZER_20110315 (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

COPYRIGHT IN THE CLOUD

3/15/2011 5:27 PM

443

Property Infringement.”215 The Center for Democracy and
Technology, an Internet civil liberties group, submitted comments
with a partial focus on the issue of intermediary liability:
Our comments also urge the IPEC to resist calls to
enlist ISPs in online copyright enforcement.
Congress—in the DMCA and Section 230—has
expressly rejected the notion that ISPs should be
responsible for policing user behavior. This policy
has led to an explosion of innovative services, and it
should not be undercut by—to name two
increasingly popular examples—“three strikes” or
filtering mandates.216
It is, at this point, unclear what will come out of the IPEC’s
public comment collection and what her next steps will be. As
noted above, the removal of the “three-strikes” footnote from the
ACTA draft, and the European Parliament’s declared objection to
it, suggests that this provision is probably dead for the time being.
The IPEC could promote a revision of the DMCA that includes a
version of this provision to operate only domestically, though there
is no evidence to suggest that such a revision is likely. Cloud
service providers should keep an eye on this process as it unfolds.
Another proposal under discussion is the Copyright Reform
Act (“CRA”), championed by Public Knowledge, a “public interest
organization that works to protect the rights of citizens and
consumers to communicate and innovate in the digital age.”217
The CRA is being developed in five parts, the first of which,
addressing fair use, was recently released.218 Overall, the CRA
aims to:
215

Coordination and Strategic Planning of the Federal Effort Against Intellectual
Property Infringement, 75 Fed. Reg. 8137 (Feb. 23, 2010).
216
Andrew McDiarmid, CDT Urges IP Czar to Focus on Bad Actors, Not
Intermediaries, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECH. (Mar. 25, 2010, 1:31 PM),
http://www.cdt.org/blogs/andrew-mcdiarmid/cdt-urges-ip-czar-focus-bad-actors-notintermediaries.
217
Jennifer M. Urban, REPORT 1 UPDATING FAIR USE FOR INNOVATORS AND CREATORS
IN THE DIGITAL AGE: TWO TARGETED REFORMS, PUB. KNOWLEDGE 1 (Feb. 13, 2010),
http://publicknowledge.org/pdf/fair-use-report-02132010.pdf.
218
Id. Public Knowledge summarized its fair use proposal as proposing to “extend[] the
list of explicitly favored uses in the preamble to section 107 of the Copyright Act to
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1. strengthen fair use, including reforming
outrageously high statutory damages, which
deter innovation and creativity;
2. reform the DMCA to permit circumvention of
digital locks for lawful purposes;
3. update the limitations and exceptions to
copyright protection to better conform with how
digital technologies work;
4. provide recourse for people and companies who
are recklessly accused of copyright infringement
and who are recklessly sent improper DMCA
take-down notices; and
5. streamline arcane music licensing laws to
encourage new and better business models for
selling music.219
On the whole, the proposals of the CRA occupy the opposite
end of the spectrum from ACTA: generally loosening copyright
liability to better accommodate the actual, modern usage of
technology and content. At present it is unclear whether the CRA
and its advocates will play a direct role in the revision and
adaptation of copyright laws in the near-term, or whether the CRA
will merely occupy the time and attention of some members of the
academy in coming years. Interestingly, the proposals in the CRA
seek to redefine the scope of copyright itself, not to create an
enforcement regime like § 512. Movement towards this type of
reform would make policing more difficult for content owners
because it would change the terms of what they own.
A present example can be seen in the role of “fair use” in
current litigation involving YouTube. In a Summary Judgment
memorandum, YouTube argues that:
[b]ecause neither the fair use (nor the de minimis
use) of a copyrighted work is an infringement, any
include incidental uses, non-consumptive uses, and uses that are both personal and noncommercial.” Pan C. Lee, Daniel S. Park, Allen W. Wang & Jennifer M. Urban,
INTRODUCTION TO THE COPYRIGHT REFORM ACT, PUB. KNOWLEDGE 8 (Feb. 13, 2010),
http://publicknowledge.org/pdf/cra-introduction-02132010.pdf.
219
Public Knowledge Proposes New Copyright Reform Act, PUB. KNOWLEDGE (Feb. 15,
2010), http://www.publicknowledge.org/node/2906 (internal citations omitted).
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clip for which there is even a debatable claim of fair
use is not one that YouTube had any obligation
under the DMCA to unilaterally remove. A service
provider cannot lose its safe harbor simply because
it might err in making what are often complex or
difficult fair-use determinations.220
If content owners argue, as UMG and Viacom have, that
service providers should police their services for infringing
content, YouTube’s argument—that fair use and de minimis
copying obfuscate claims of infringement making unilateral
determinations difficult if not impossible—effectively counters the
implication of a duty. If the CRA successfully broadens the
definition of fair use, or otherwise alters the scope of copyright,
YouTube’s argument is only bolstered by the increase in content
that may, on its face, appear to be infringing, but, as a matter of
law, is not.
None of these reform efforts fully engage the question of
whether the relevant technology has changed sufficiently since
1998 to require a reexamination of the DMCA. One of the issues
at the heart of both the Veoh and YouTube litigations is the
characterization of the respective defendants’ systems.221 We can
fairly say that in 1998 the prospect of a YouTube-style system
would be unfamiliar to most people, and certainly to members of
Congress. Accordingly, we have no assurance as to whether
Congress might have drafted the DMCA differently if, as UMG
argues, the safe harbor was only intended to protect websites, of
the variety common in 1998, and not interactive sites such as
YouTube.com.222 More generally speaking, Web 2.0 services have
operated entirely under the aegis of the DMCA’s provisions,
especially its safe harbor, and thus far courts have condoned
DMCA-compliant behavior.223
The system designed by Cablevision, at issue in Cartoon
Network, is another example of technological convergence that
220

YouTube Brief, supra note 139, at 53.
See supra notes 133–44 and accompanying text.
222
See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 620 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1090–91
(C.D. Cal. 2008).
223
See, e.g., id. at 1083.
221
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challenges the definitions drafted to support the DMCA.224
Broadly, the prospect of full-quality television transmitted using
the same Internet protocol that enabled the web was a foreign
concept in 1998. While the trend of judicial decisions suggests
that reevaluation and revision are not imminently needed, they
raise the question of how long the underlying structure of the
DMCA can last before it becomes as obsolete as the computers of
the late 20th century.
CONCLUSION
With current reform efforts all in their early stages, we must
look to existing statutes and judicial interpretations to assess the
near-term viability of copyright enforcement in the cloud. Barring
significant judicial departure from the rules applied in Veoh,
YouTube, Fung, and Cartoon Network—rules based in large
measure on Grokster and Netcom—the challenge lies with content
owners to devise a means to better protect their rights. The
situation is not as bleak as copyright owners make it out to be. The
music industry has survived the creation of the mp3 format,225 and
has bested Napster and Grokster,226 leading to greater innovation in
the industry’s business model. The movie industry is similarly
poised to thrive, striking down the most egregious Internet pirates
and using the same technology to advance its content delivery
systems.227 The last decade has shown us that those who play by
the rules—those of copyright law generally and the DMCA in
particular—on both sides of the field benefit. Those, like Fung,
who blatantly violate rights, and aid and abet infringement by
others will face the consequences, just as those, like UMG, who

224

See Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 127–29 (2d Cir.
2008).
225
See Steven Seidenberg, The Record Business Blues, A.B.A.J. (June 1, 2010, 4:20
AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/the_record_business_blues.
226
See generally Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913
(2005); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002).
227
See, e.g., Grokster, 545 U.S. at 913; see also Eric Pfanner, Four Convicted in
Sweden in Internet Piracy Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/
2009/04/18/business/global/18pirate.html.
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flout the established system to pursue a more aggressive one may
find themselves out in the cold.
Attempts to hook ISPs with greater liability and responsibility
would disrupt the existing Internet ecosystem to a degree that
could stifle overall progress for the sake of protecting mostly largescale content owners, an effort that is unlikely to succeed in the
long run. The CRA proposals may go too far towards attempting
to codify the notion of Internet exceptionalism228 in ways it has not
previously been codified, but the CRA does benefit from being
responsive to actual conditions, as compared with ACTA’s behindthe-eight-ball attempts to over-police an area of control that has
clearly slipped away from rights holders. While partisans on each
side of this debate insist that a new system is necessary, the status
quo regime, combining statutes and judicial precedent, has proven
remarkably adaptable to the changes in the ways that Internet
technologies are applied. Large-scale reforms, at present, appear
both unnecessary and more likely to cause harm than to bring
about improvements.

228

Peter Margulies, The Clear and Present Internet: Terrorism, Cyberspace,
and the First Amendment, 2004 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 4 (2004), available at
http://www.lawtechjournal.com/articles/2004/04_041207_margulies.php
(“Many prominent commentators embrace a view we can call ‘Internet
Exceptionalism,’ which stresses distinctions between the Internet and earlier
communications media such as books, newspapers, and broadcasts. Internet
Exceptionalists cite a variety of the Internet’s attributes, centering on the same
simultaneity and absence of mediation that preoccupied courts and
commentators with regard to previous technological innovations. For example,
Internet Exceptionalists note how the Internet enhances consumers’ ability to
assemble an individualized collage of information from a variety of specialized
and partisan sources, without the intercession of an intermediary, such as an
editor, who may offer a broader perspective.”).

